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ABSTRACT 
Despite extensive use of housing data to reveal valuation of non-market 
goods, the process of house price adjustment remains vague. Using the 
restricted access American Housing Survey, a high-frequency panel of 
prices, turnover, and occupant characteristics, this paper examines the time 
path of prices and preference-based sorting in response to air quality 
changes caused by differential regulatory pressure from the 1990 Clean 
Air Act Amendments. The results suggest that owner-occupied units 
capitalize changes quickly, whereas rent prices lag behind amenity levels. 
The delayed but sharp rent response temporally coincides with evidence of 
sorting, indicating a strong link between location choices and price 
dynamics.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 Charles Tiebout (1956) argued that households should “vote with their feet” and choose 
residential locations with the optimal bundle of amenities and price. Since that time, and 
especially after Rosen’s (1974) formal development of hedonic theory, hedonic valuation has 
become a workhorse model among economists – Google Scholar reports over 30,000 articles 
using or discussing the method.1 This impressive level of application is justifiable given that 
housing market data can be used to uncover people’s preferences and values for a wide range of 
spatially delineated non-market goods including school quality, crime, open space, and air 
pollution.  
Despite the extensive use of housing data to reveal valuation of non-market goods, the 
process of house price adjustment remains vague. Hedonic theory is based on equilibrium; the 
compensating differential in housing prices across locations reflects the value of amenity 
differences, such that the marginal mover is indifferent between locations. Rosen’s model 
assumes costless relocation, which most empirical applications extend to indicate immediate 
price responses reflecting the changed amenity. Of course this assumption does not reflect 
reality, and our understanding of how prices and households dynamically respond to a change in 
amenity levels is limited. Further, the extent to which housing market dynamics impact the 
resulting valuation estimates is unknown. A study with a short time span could produce biased 
estimates of the amenity value due to insufficient time for price adjustment. A study with a long 
time span may also produce biased estimates if important determinants of house prices, which 
change on the time span of a decade but not one or two years, are unobserved and correlated with 
amenity changes. 
This paper addresses these dynamic extensions of Tiebout’s ideas in the context of large 
improvements in air quality that occurred in the United States during the 1990s. Specifically, I 
examine the path of prices for both owners and renters in response to a change in air quality – 
going beyond if prices change to how prices change – and assess how these price response 
patterns may bias valuation estimates. Further, I analyze preference-based sorting and seek to 
understand the links between sorting behavior and price dynamics.  
                                                          
1 The search term was “hedonic valuation” excluding “wage” and “labor”, and the counts were as of August 21, 
2014. 
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The keystone of addressing these questions is the American Housing Survey (AHS), 
which collects information from a nationally representative panel of housing units and their 
occupants every two years, including self-reported home value or rent. The high frequency and 
regularity of observations is essential for examination of price dynamics and sorting, and no 
other non-proprietary data offers this.2 I match housing units from the AHS to particulate matter 
(PM10) concentrations measured from nearby air quality monitors, and I exploit the structure of 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) to identify quasi-exogenous variation in PM10. 
Similar to the seminal work of Chay and Greenstone (2005), I employ an Instrumental Variables 
(IV) strategy that relies on non-attainment designations of the air quality standards to address the 
endogenous relationship between air quality and housing prices.  
Importantly, I gained access to the confidential version of the AHS through a Census 
Restricted Data Center. Unlike the public use AHS, which only identifies the geographic location 
of a housing unit at the MSA level, the confidential version identifies the census tract where each 
unit is located. This fine scale enables two critical aspects of the present research. First, the air 
quality that a given household faces can be measured with far greater precision. Second, the IV 
identification strategy can exploit localized air quality regulation intensity stemming from 
within-MSA differential regulatory pressure, which Auffhammer et al. (2009) show is the 
principal factor determining reductions in PM10.  
 The results suggest that while both owner and renter prices are responsive to air quality 
changes, the path of prices markedly differs. Owner-occupied housing units capitalize changes in 
air quality immediately, and capitalization rates and elasticities stay fairly constant across time. 
On the other hand, renter-occupied housing units show statistically insignificant and 
economically small price responses shortly after air quality changes, but the estimated valuation 
sharply increases at a lag of six years and continues to increase after that. Ten years after air 
quality began to change, estimated price elasticities are comparable to the owner-occupied units. 
Tests of statistical differences support the ideas that rental price responses increase over time and 
                                                          
2 Additionally, the structure of the AHS obviates standard concerns when estimating a hedonic model. First, the 
omission of unobserved unit or location characteristics commonly biases hedonic estimates. The AHS offers 
multiple observations for each housing unit and thus time-invariant omitted variables do not pose a problem. When 
using sales data, researchers often rely on repeat sales to purge these time-invariant confounders. However, a repeat 
sales model can exclude as much as 97% of observations (Case and Quigley 1991). Further, transacting properties 
are not random; Case, Pollakowski, and Wachter (1997) show that properties that transact more tend to appreciate 
more, as well as have different structural characteristics. Appreciation estimates from the AHS will not have this 
same bias since all units report price changes, not just those that sell, and the units are randomly sampled. 
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that short-term price responses are different for owners and renters, though with the later point, 
the evidence is mixed. This suite of results is robust to controlling for sample selection and 
controlling for pre-treatment price trends. 
Several hypotheses are examined that could explain why rental prices lag behind amenity 
changes, including rental market rigidities, like rent control, and disparities in the characteristics 
of people and units that rent versus own. However, in each case the results maintain their pattern. 
Speculatively, the disparities in price response patterns could be due to owners being more 
attentive of amenity levels given their anticipated tenure and financial stake in the property. 
Interestingly, adjustment costs of moving, which are substantially larger for owners, appear not 
to be a factor affecting price dynamics.  
The results support the idea that the owner and renter market are fairly distinct. 
Disparities between the two markets have already been documented in terms of the occupants 
and housing stock by Glaeser and Gyourko (2007), but demonstrating disparities in price 
dynamics is new. The different patterns of price responses lead to arbitrage opportunities 
between the owner and renter market purely based on air quality. However, at a maximum the 
disparity in annual housing costs is about $600, which is unlikely to be enough for households to 
delay home purchase and certainly not enough to cover the financial costs of selling a home in 
order to be a renter. In sum, the price response results lend credence to the hedonic method for 
owner data, but suggest caution with renter data. For renters, the immediate price response is 
about one tenth of the eventual price response, suggesting substantial bias with the hedonic 
method if too short of a time interval is chosen. 
The striking price dynamics observed in the rental market offer an excellent opportunity 
to examine the interplay between valuation and preference-based sorting. I analyze changes in 
turnover and demographic variables related to age, race, education, and income in response to 
changes in air quality. The results suggest that neighborhoods that experience improvements in 
air quality see an increase in the turnover frequency and the likelihood of families with children 
moving in relative to other neighborhoods, but only at a lag of six or more years. Thus, the 
results indicate a temporal correspondence between price dynamics and preference-based sorting 
and offer a strong empirical confirmation of Tiebout’s ideas.  
 There are three main contributions of this paper. The first is to shed new light on how 
housing prices respond to a change in amenities. Despite extensive use of hedonic valuation, 
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very few papers have addressed the dynamic details of price responses.3 Blanchard and Katz 
(1992) find that house prices decline after a negative shock to employment, but rebound faster 
than employment levels. Cellini et al. (2010) examine the effect of school spending from bond 
passage on house price sales. Their results suggest that capitalization rates tend to increase for 
two to three years following a bond and then stabilize, likely reflecting the trend that spending 
ramps up for three to four years following the referendum and then declines. Together, my 
results and others’ agree that owner-occupied capitalization is quick, even for different amenities 
for which residents may have different preferences for and information about.  
Second, I go beyond looking at the owner market, as Cellini et al. have done, and 
examine the dynamics of rental price responses as well. This aspect complements several recent 
papers that examine price responses for owner and renter units separately: Grainger (2012) and 
Bento et al. (2014) assess the distributional impacts of the 1990 CAAA and Davis (2011) 
examines the housing market impacts of new power plants. Each paper finds that rental prices 
are responsive to amenity changes, but less so than their owner-occupied counterparts. However, 
each of these papers use decennial census data, and thus only address differences in levels of 
price responses, whereas I employ the high frequency AHS to investigate differences in patterns 
of price adjustments. Interestingly, in a cross sectional setting, Banzhaf and Farooque (2013) and 
Winters (2012) both find that rental prices are more correlated with public goods and quality of 
life than owner values, which raises the possibility that rents better reflect amenity preferences in 
equilibrium. In contrast, my results suggest that when amenities are changing rapidly owner 
values better capture preferences. 
 Third, this paper complements prior work on the links between price response and 
preference-based sorting.4 Sieg et al. (2004) and Bayer et al. (2007) examine how general 
equilibrium effects can be substantially larger than direct effects of an amenity differential alone 
because of correlated preferences for the amenity in question and other neighborhood “goods”. 
For example, wealthy households locate in good school districts and their presence further causes 
house prices to appreciate because people want to live near them. The limitation of these papers 
                                                          
3 Figlio and Lucas (2004) and Pope (2008) are additional papers that examine the responsiveness of house prices. 
Both papers examine changing information, not changing amenities, and find that prices are quick to respond to 
new information. 
4 Other prominent papers that examine preference-based sorting include: Cameron and McConnaha (2006) and 
Greenstone and Gallagher (2008) in response to Superfund cleanups; Cellini et al. (2010) for school quality; Card 
et al. (2008) for racial preferences; and Banzhaf and Walsh (2008, 2013) for toxic emissions. 
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is that they rely on cross sectional identification and thus do not actually observe sorting 
dynamics, only an equilibrium snapshot. The benefit of my partial equilibrium approach is that I 
do observe dynamic sorting behavior in response to quasi-exogenous amenity changes and find 
that prices and sorting are dynamically linked. The limitation of my approach, however, is that I 
cannot distinguish direct versus indirect valuation. It is possible that the true valuation of air 
quality for renters is zero, as reflected in the short term unresponsiveness of prices, and the rapid 
increase in prices several years later is not due to air quality but due to preferences for living near 
the new types of people moving into the cleaned up areas. However, given that the sorting 
analysis indicates that income, race and education levels (which are the key drivers of social 
multipliers in Bayer et al.) do not change on average between old and new occupants, it seems 
less likely that the delayed price response is greatly affected by social multipliers and is thus 
likely a good indication of direct preferences for air quality for renters. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the setting in which I examine 
price response patterns and the use of the CAAA as a quasi-experiment. Section 3 discusses data, 
including summary statistics comparing renters to owners and treated to untreated. Sections 4 
and 5 present the price response results and the sorting results, respectively. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2  THE 1990 CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS AS A QUASI-EXPERIMENT 
2.1  Background on Particulate Matter and the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments  
Particulate matter is a class of solid and liquid air pollutants that consists of nitrates, 
organic chemicals, metals, soot, smoke, and dust. Particulate matter enters the atmosphere either 
directly from a source, such as construction sites, unpaved roads, fields, smokestacks or fires, or 
indirectly as the result of reactions from sulfur dioxides and nitrogen oxides that are emitted 
from power plants, industrial facilities, or motor vehicles (Unites States Environmental 
Protection Agency [EPA] 2010). In general, the contribution of indirect sources is substantially 
larger to overall particulate matter concentrations than the contribution of direct sources. 
Particulate matter is classified by the measurement of its diameter, with the diameter 
being inversely related to the potential for human health damage. PM10, the pollutant of interest 
in this paper, is particulate matter that is less than 10 micrometers in diameter. At this diameter, 
particulate matter can penetrate deeply into the human respiratory system and cause numerous 
health problems, including aggravated asthma, chronic bronchitis, and even premature death for 
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those with pre-existing lung and heart problems (EPA 2010).5  
 Responding to calls for action and mounting scientific evidence, the United States 
Congress passed the 1970 CAA, which was the first federal legislation establishing air quality 
control.6 The 1970 CAA created the EPA and authorized it to enforce National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six common air pollutants, the so-called criteria pollutants. 
Particulate matter was included in this group in the form of total suspended particulates, or TSPs, 
which is particulate matter of diameter 100 micrometers or less. The 1990 CAAA, the second 
major update of the CAA, replaced TSPs with PM10 to parallel current scientific understanding 
of pollution’s effects.7  
 The objective of the NAAQS was to lower concentrations of the criteria pollutants below 
harmful levels everywhere in the United States. For PM10, the EPA set an annual arithmetic 
mean daily readings concentration threshold of 50 µg/m3 and a 24-hour arithmetic mean 
concentration threshold of 150 µg/m3.8 In order to achieve the NAAQS, the EPA held counties 
and states accountable for meeting those standards. Importantly, if even a single monitor within a 
county exceeds the annual threshold or the 24-hour threshold for more than one day, then the 
entire county is considered in violation of the standard. The EPA can then move to designate that 
county as out of attainment, which then requires the county and state, in cooperation with the 
EPA, to develop an official plan to reduce pollution and attain the standards set forth by the 
NAAQS. As a means to encourage compliance, non-attainment counties can be subject to 
scrutiny over industrial activities, including the opening of new plants, and can even have federal 
highway funds withheld.   
 
 
 
                                                          
5 For a concise analysis of the health effects from exposure to PM10, see Hall et al. (1992), Dominici et al. (2002), 
and Daniels et al. (2000). In addition to human health effects, particulate matter damages crops and buildings and 
reduces visibility (EPA 2010).  
6 Prior federal legislation in the 1950s and 1960s merely provided funds for monitoring air quality and for research 
on the impacts of pollution on health and agriculture (EPA 2010).  
7 In addition, the 1990 CAAA expanded the scope of federal regulation by adding control over the release of 189 
toxic chemicals and by initiating the Acid Rain Program. In 1997, the EPA further refined the NAAQS to target 
PM2.5, again reflecting current understanding. 
8 The EPA sets primary and secondary standards for all criteria pollutants, where primary standards address human 
health, especially of vulnerable populations, and secondary standards address overall human welfare. For PM10, the 
primary and secondary standards are identical. 
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2.2  Quasi-experimental variation 
Empirical estimates of the true relationship between air quality and housing prices are 
obscured by a suite of unobserved factors that simultaneously influence both air quality and 
housing prices. For example, a recently built highway may worsen local air quality but increase 
local house prices. Such correlations, which we generally expect to bias the estimated price 
response of air quality toward zero, are at the root of the endogeneity problem that calls for an 
instrumental variable strategy. My approach treats the 1990 CAAA as a quasi-experiment to 
address the unobserved factors that affect both housing prices and pollution.  
 My identification strategy stems from that of Chay and Greenstone (2005) and follows 
closely that of Bento et al. (2014). Chay and Greenstone exploit the structure of the 1970 CAA to 
instrument for changes in TSPs at the county level between 1970 and 1980 using county non-
attainment status in the mid-1970s. They demonstrate that the attainment designations in 1975 
and 1976 are strongly correlated with decadal changes in TSPs and housing prices, but not other 
county characteristics that may affect home prices (e.g., average income, population), and thus 
their instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction. 
Bento et al. again utilize federal regulation, this time the 1990 CAAA, to instrument for 
changes in PM10 between 1990 and 2000. In contrast to Chay and Greenstone, they expand the 
window of mid-decade attainment designations to 1992-97 and, in addition to county attainment 
status, use individual air quality monitor attainment designations. Due to the fact that an entire 
county is designated non-attainment when just one monitor exceeds either threshold, optimizing 
local officials will exclusively target clean-up efforts in the areas around non-attainment 
monitors (Auffhammer et al. 2009).  
 Consistent with Bento et al., I use individual air quality monitor readings instead of 
county averages, however I focus primarily on the monitor attainment designation to identify 
exogenous changes in air quality. The monitor instrument I construct is the ratio of years that the 
monitor is out of attainment to the number of years for which there is a record in the years 
between housing observations. I opt for a ratio instrument over binary to better model 
heterogeneity in regulation strength. Areas with persistent air quality violations like southern 
California are likely to have larger reductions in PM10 than areas that infrequently violated the 
standards. This construction is clarified in Section 2.3. 
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For my monitor non-attainment instrument to be valid, it must be correlated with PM10 
changes and only affect housing prices through its impact on air quality. First, I examine the time 
series of PM10 with respect to attainment designation. Figure 1 shows PM10 trends for the years 
1989-2001 for three mutually exclusive groups: 1) monitors that exceeded the standards at some 
point during 1989-2001, 2) monitors in counties that were designated non-attainment at some 
point during 1989-2001, and 3) monitors never designated non-attainment nor located in a non-
attainment county. Figure 1 shows that PM10 levels fell for all three types of monitors, and 
concentrations converged over the 1990s, which is exactly the intent of the NAAQS. The largest 
reductions in PM10 clearly occurred for non-attainment monitors, which declined by a total of 
18.0 µg/m3 over the years 1989-2001, 10.1 more than in-attainment monitors in non-attainment 
counties and 10.5 more than monitors in in-attainment counties. While county non-attainment 
monitors do experience additional declines in PM10 compared to county in-attainment monitors, 
the differential is small and the trends are graphically very similar. Additionally, Figure 1 
demonstrates that the majority of air quality improvements occurred early in the decade; 80% of 
total PM10 reductions observed for non-attainment monitors had occurred by 1992.  
 My IV approach relies on the assumption that, conditional on other observable housing, 
neighborhood, and county characteristics, nonattainment status only affects house prices through 
its impact on local pollution levels. One concern with this assumption is that the CAAA 
regulation affects the local economy, and thus indirectly affects home prices. In fact, a 
substantial body of research has shown that air quality regulation has a significant effect 
deterring new firms (Becker and Henderson 2000), off-shoring production (Hanna 2010), and on 
employment levels (Kahn and Mansur 2010, Walker 2011). However, these findings focus on the 
economic decisions and outcomes of polluting firms only, which represent a relatively small 
portion of the total economic activity of an area.  
To get a sense of the impact of regulation on the overall economic robustness of an area, 
I analyzed the effect of individual monitor exceedences, as well as the EPA county level 
attainment designation, on annual measures of county average income, population, and total 
employment. The results, detailed in the Online Appendix, show that both monitor and county 
non-attainment measures have an insignificant effect on the three economic measures 
considered, which is consistent with the ambiguous total impact of non-attainment status found 
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by Kahn and Mansur (2010) (see their Table 5). While this analysis is limited, it gives no reason 
to think that the IV exclusion restriction is violated. 
 
2.3  Empirical framework 
In this section, I outline the econometric approach I use to estimate the house price 
response to air quality changes and how households may adjust their location preferences in 
response to the air quality changes. Because the non-attainment instrument predicts changes in 
air quality, I use a first difference specification. In order to examine how the price response and 
sorting behavior may change over time, I construct multiple datasets with differing lags between 
observations. Since the AHS is sampled every two years, there are five total datasets with lags 
equal to two, four, six, eight, and ten years. The first and second stage equations of the first 
difference IV analysis are 
    ∆𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝑁𝑖𝑖 + (∆𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊)𝜹+ ∆𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖    (1) 
and  
    ∆𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃�∆𝑃𝑃� 𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ (∆𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊)𝜷+ ∆𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖   (2) 
where pijt is the natural log of price (either house value or annual rent) of housing unit i matched 
to air quality monitor j in time period t, PMijt is the concentration of PM10 for monitor j in time 
period t, and Xijt is a vector of unit and location covariates. The instrument in Equation (1), Njt, is 
based on monitor non-attainment designation. If in Equations (1) and (2), the first difference is 
taken between years t1 and t2, then the monitor instrument equals the ratio of non-attainment 
years to the total number of years of observation during the years [t1+1, t2].9 θ is the coefficient 
of interest and measures the change in log of house price due to a one-unit change in PM10. 
Implicit in the first difference model is a unit specific fixed effect that absorbs time invariant 
characteristics of areas that might be correlated with house prices and air quality, such as climate 
and topographical features, proximity to open space, and transportation infrastructure.  
 A potentially more intuitive approach to modeling the dynamics of price responses would 
be regressing changes on housing prices on concurrent changes in pollution and lagged changes 
in pollution. This specification is less preferred because it necessitates two first stages (or more if 
                                                          
9 If a monitor exceeds the standards in year t, then that monitor would be designated non-attainment in year t+1. 
Exceeding the standard in year t1-1 could reduce pollution in year t1 as well as year t2. , and thus the effect of non-
attainment status in year t1 on changes in pollution between t1 and t2 is ambiguous. For this reason, the range of 
non-attainment years entering the instrument is [t1+1, t2]. 
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more than one lag is included) making the local average treatment effect difficult to interpret. 
However, for completeness, I present estimates from this dynamic specification in Section 4.1.10   
To explore preference-based sorting in response to changes in air quality, I estimate a 
variant of the IV first difference model above, except the second stage dependent variable can be 
a range of variables measuring turnover and changes in demographic characteristics of 
occupants.11 The second stage equation becomes 
    𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃�∆𝑃𝑃� 𝑖𝑖𝑖�+ (∆𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊)𝜷+ ∆𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖   (3). 
First, I define yijt to be binary and equal to one if unit i has turned over during the interval ending 
at t and zero otherwise. In this case, Equation (3) is estimated using a logistic model. Second, I 
estimate models of sorting on observable characteristics that may be correlated with preferences 
for air quality: household head over the age of 65, the presence of children under 18, household 
head is either Black or Hispanic, educational attainment of the household head, and household 
income. For all characteristics except household income, yijt is binary and equals one if the 
demographic characteristic of choice has “increased” (i.e., the household head of the prior 
occupants was under 65 and the household head of the new occupants is over 65) and equals zero 
if the demographic characteristic of choice has “decreased”.12 All unit-intervals that either do not 
experience turnover or do not have a change in the given demographic group are excluded. This 
restriction allows me to estimate (3) for this class of sorting models using a logistic model. For 
household income, yijt equals the differenced log household income of the entering household 
from the exiting household, and the sample is still restricted to those units that turnover. Since yijt 
is continuous in this case, Equation (3) is estimated using two stage least squares.  
 
3  DATA 
 This section discusses the source and relevant features of the air quality data, regulatory 
data, housing data (including how local house price trends are managed), neighborhood data, and 
                                                          
10 Another approach would be a Regression Discontinuity research design, similar to Chay and Greenstone (2005). 
Unfortunately, there are too few non-attainment observations to get the needed density around the cutoff to 
implement this design. 
11 Theory suggests that sorting will occur when an amenity changes, either for better or for worse, which could lead 
to an asymmetric effect for improvements versus declines in air quality. Fortunately, the CAAA only induced PM10 
levels to decline, and thus a simple linear specification is sufficient to estimate sorting. 
12 The dependent variable for the educational attainment specification equals one if educational attainment has 
increased with the new occupants (i.e., a high school dropout moves out and either a high school graduate or 
university graduate moves in) and zero if educational attainment has declined. 
12 
county economic activity data, as well as additional details on how the air quality and housing 
data were matched. The Data Appendix provides a complete listing of all variables used in the 
regression analysis.  
 
3.1  Air quality data 
 Individual air quality monitor records were obtained from the Air Quality Standards 
(AQS) database (EPA 2009). Monitors are placed throughout the United States, but are primarily 
located in urban areas. For each monitor, the database includes the annual mean PM10 
concentration, the number of days the PM10 concentration was above the 24-hour threshold, the 
geospatial coordinates of the monitor, and several reliability measures. For the purposes of my 
analysis, I restrict monitor-year observations to those that are sufficiently reliable.13 For the key 
measure of air quality, I use the annual mean PM10 concentration.  
 
3.2  Attainment status 
 I construct an attainment status for each monitor-year directly from the AQS data using 
the same threshold rules as the EPA’s county designation. If in a given year a monitor’s annual 
PM10 concentration is greater than 50 µg/m3 or its 24 hour concentration exceeds 150 µg/m3 for 
two days or more, then that monitor is designated non-attainment in the following year. Monitor 
attainment status serves as the main instrument in the IV model.  
 The western region of the United States contains most of the monitor-year exceedences – 
about 80% with California making up half. While the price response and sorting models I present 
are national in scope, California and the West are driving the results. 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 Title 40 Part 58.12 and Title 40 Part 50 Appendix K of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) prescribe the 
monitoring frequencies for PM10 monitors, as well as the criteria for establishing whether a monitor is 
“representative” and therefore should be included in the analysis. In the AQS data, a criteria flag is set based on 
data completeness criteria so that if it is set to “Y”, then the assumption can be made that the data represent the 
sampling period of the year. These summary criteria are based on 75% or greater data capture and data reported for 
all four calendar quarters in each year. Additionally, I exclude monitor-year observations that are affected by 
“extreme natural events” beyond human influence. These choices are made to reflect the EPA’s designation 
decisions. When including unreliable monitors in the analysis, the price response patterns are similar but 
coefficients are attenuated.  
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3.3  Housing unit and occupant characteristics 
 Housing data for the years 1989-2001 were obtained from the restricted access American 
Housing Survey National Sample (AHS). The AHS is a panel of housing units that are surveyed 
every two years, usually between August and November. The AHS collects information about 
self-reported house value (if owner occupied), rent (if renter occupied), dwelling characteristics 
(e.g., number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, whether the unit is rent controlled), occupant 
characteristics (e.g., race, education, income), and when the current occupants moved in.14 15 
Importantly, the AHS follows units, not occupants, yielding a high frequency panel of prices. 
 Unlike the public use version, the restricted access AHS records the census tract where 
each unit is located. Using GIS, I determined the distance between each tract’s geographic 
center, or centroid, and surrounding air quality monitors. I was then able to match housing units 
to air quality monitors on the basis of least distance. 
To build the datasets used to estimate Equations (1) and (2), I create datasets with two, 
four, six, eight, and ten years between observations. For example, if a housing unit was surveyed 
in 1989, 1991, 1993, and 1995, this unit would enter the two-year difference panel with years 
1989-1991, 1991-1993, and 1993-1995, the four-year difference panel with years 1989-1993, 
and the six-year panel with years 1989-1995. The differenced intervals are non-overlapping and 
priority is given to earlier intervals, as most of the PM10 reductions occurred early in the decade. 
In the example just given, only one of 1989-1993 and 1991-1995 can be included in the four-
year panel due to the overlap, and 1989-1993 is chosen because it occurs earlier in the decade.  
 In a similar manner as done with the units, I construct monitor-interval pairs that are then 
matched with the unit-interval pairs on the basis of least distance. As units get further away from 
monitors, more measurement error is introduced into the key air quality variable. I exclude all 
matches greater than three miles in distance to balance measurement error with sample size 
concerns. This method of matching monitor and unit-intervals ensures that units are matched to 
the same air quality monitors at the beginning and end of an interval, while still allowing the 
                                                          
14 Kiel and Zabel (1999) examine bias stemming from self-reported prices and find that self-reported values tend to 
be inflated over market prices, but consistently so. Thus, as long as self-reported values are being compared to 
other self-reported values, the bias should not affect results.  
15 In addition to the sample restrictions based on distance to a monitor, I exclude unit-year observations when prices 
are interpolated/“hot decked” or error coded. Further, prices are edited if they are obviously miscoded by omission 
or insertion of a digit. For instance, if a unit’s price sequence is $100,000, $10,000, $100,000, then the middle price 
would be changed to $100,000 as it appears a zero was omitted. After editing prices, I exclude units whose prices 
change by a factor of four in a two-year interval.  
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monitor-unit match to change across intervals. This strategy balances the competing goals of 
minimizing measurement error and maximizing sample size.16 I chose not to interpolate PM10 
values between monitors, so that the attainment designation can be clearly assigned at the 
monitor level. 
 
3.3.1 Summary statistics 
 The first two columns of Table 1 provide sample means for included  housing units and 
their occupants for owners and renters separately.17 A major theme of this paper is disparities 
between the owner and renter market. Column 3 of Table 1 compares owners to renters for the 
included sample and shows that the units themselves as well as the occupants differ dramatically 
between the two groups. Owner-occupied units are on average nearly 1000 square feet larger, 
have 1.2 more bedrooms, have 0.5 more bathrooms, and are 30 percentage points more likely to 
have a dishwasher and 20 percentage points more likely to have an air conditioner than renter-
occupied units. Owner households make on average $17,750 more in income and are 20 
percentage points less likely to be a minority than renter households. One particularly important 
difference for the research at hand is the turnover rate, where renter units were 32 percentage 
points more likely (40% compared to 8%) to turn over between 1987 and 1989. Intuitively, the 
fluidity of the renter market may enable rental prices to respond faster to changes in amenities 
than owner prices, but this is of course not the only difference between the two markets. These 
substantial differences are especially remarkable given that included units are located primarily 
in urban areas and that, in general, much of the difference between the owner and renter market 
stems from the fact that most rental units are in the urban core and owner-occupied units are 
disproportionately in the suburbs. These differences reinforce the motivation for estimating all 
models separately for owner-occupied and renter-occupied units.  
Finally, consider the relationship between attainment designation and housing unit and 
occupant characteristics. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 examine the pre-treatment conditions of the 
housing units, comparing unit and occupant characteristics in 1989 for housing units matched to 
non-attainment monitors versus in-attainment monitors, again comparing owners and renters 
separately. Owner-occupied units in monitor non-attainment areas are worth less, are smaller, 
                                                          
16 Requiring a unit to only match with one monitor reduces sample size by 22-29% depending on the interval. Price 
response patterns are similar with this restriction imposed. 
17 Sample means for excluded units and non-attainment and in-attainment units are given in the Online Appendix. 
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and have fewer appliances. The differences in housing values are suggestive of a compensating 
differential for air quality differences, but could also be mostly or entirely due to differences in 
housing stock or other locational amenities across different areas that happen to be correlated 
with air quality levels. Rental rates in monitor non-attainment areas are actually higher, which 
underscores the difficulty with cross sectional estimation. While many demographic variables are 
not significantly different between the groups, non-attainment areas have fewer high school 
graduates, but more college graduates. One of the most important pre-treatment characteristics to 
consider is prior appreciation of housing prices because an existing price trend could bias 
valuation estimates. Table 1 shows no statistically significant difference in prior appreciation; a 
robustness check in the Online Appendix confirms inclusion of past price changes does not affect 
results. In addition, there is not a statistically significant difference in either changes in 
household income or the rate of turnover between 1987 and 1989. While the groups are not 
perfectly balanced pre-treatment, the statistics offer no reason to be concerned about 
confounding effects of the identification strategy. 
 
3.4  Local housing market trends 
 Because the scope of this study is national and thus compares appreciation rates across 
many cities and regions, it is necessary to control for local housing market trends. If regional 
house price trends are correlated with patterns of air quality improvements, the valuation 
estimates could reflect those trends instead of responses to air quality changes. I institute a novel 
method that controls for local housing market trends by using external data. Freddie Mac 
publishes the Conventional Mortgage Home Price Index (CMHPI), which gives quarterly 
estimates of home price levels (Freddie Mac 2010). Freddie Mac offers MSA specific indices for 
11 large MSAs (Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Ft. Worth, Detroit, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, 
Philadelphia, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington DC), as well as state specific indices for 
every state.  If a housing unit is located within one of the 11 MSAs, then it is matched to that 
index, otherwise it is matched to the state index. Using each of these MSA/state-specific indices, 
all housing prices were brought to 2001 levels using the third quarter index (to match the 
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sampling schedule of the AHS).18 Given the adjustments made to house prices using the CMHPI, 
the dependent variable in the valuation regressions is, in essence, appreciation relative to the 
local housing market trend. Thus, while the scope of the study is national, I am able to compare 
housing price changes from one part of the country to another because all price changes are 
relative to a smaller market. Another approach would be to include state-by-year or MSA-by-
year fixed effects in the regression model to control for unobservable trends and shocks that may 
bias the estimated relationship. However, given the sparseness of AHS data and spatial 
concentration of non-attainment air quality monitors, this strategy captures too much variation to 
still identify the price-pollution gradient; CMHPI de-trending is used as a similar second best 
option. One limitation of the CMHPI is that it is an index comprised of only owner-occupied 
prices. In Section 4.2, I investigate how using a price index derived exclusively from rental data 
affects the estimated rent response. 
Much like housing prices, there are regional trends in turnover and demographics that 
must be taken into account in order to accurately measure preference-based sorting at a national 
scale. Unfortunately, no analogous CMHPI exists for demographic changes. As a second best, I 
include changes in turnover and demographic characteristics at the MSA level (aggregated from 
decennial census data) as covariates in the estimation of (3).19 With this strategy, the locational 
choice of, for example, households over 65 in response to changes in PM10 is conditional on the 
MSA level changes in the over 65 population. 
 
3.5  Neighborhood characteristics 
The socioeconomic characteristics of neighbors are, without question, an important piece 
of a housing unit’s value or rent. While the AHS offers many benefits, the observations are 
nowhere near spatially dense enough to measure important neighborhood variables. To alleviate 
this restriction, I use the census tract identifier in the AHS to include tract level decennial census 
                                                          
18 For specificity, if 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the house price of unit i in MSA m in year t in current dollars, then the CMHPI adjusted 
house price is 𝑦�𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖  where 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the price index for MSA m in year t, with 𝑐𝑐ℎ𝑝𝑖𝑖2001 
normalized to 1 for all m. 
19 Effective MSAs are constructed by grouping units in the same MSA, and then grouping units not located in a 
MSA by state.  
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data from GeoLytics Neighborhood Change Database.20 Of course, these data are only available 
in 1990 and 2000, and I assume a linear trend to impute values for all years 1989-2001. 
 
3.6  County economic characteristics 
 From the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), I include annual average county income, 
and I include employment data from the County Business Patterns (CBP) database. CBP gives 
yearly employment counts broken down by Standard Industrial Classification/North American 
Industry Classification System codes for each county. I aggregate the number of jobs into five 
major categories that are intended to be most relevant to air quality: construction, manufacturing, 
mining, agriculture/forestry, and a catch all for the remaining codes.  
 
4  PRICE RESPONSE RESULTS 
 Tables 2 and 3 present the results for the IV first difference model, presented in 
Equations (1) and (2), for interval lengths of two, four, six, eight, and ten years for owner-
occupied and renter-occupied units, respectively.21 Consistent with expectations, the monitor 
non-attainment instrument performs well in predicting drops in particulate matter. Just focusing 
on Table 2, the coefficient on monitor non-attainment is -5.75 for the two-year lag, then 
increases to -12.10 for the four-year lag and -19.21 for the six-year lag, and then remains roughly 
at that level: -22.03 and -16.22 for the eight- and ten-year lags, respectively.22 F-statistics range 
from 21.36 to 75.61, suggesting a strong instrument and, indeed, that regulation has a strong 
effect on air quality. The first stages are approximately the same for owners and renters, but 
differ slightly due to different values for covariates and a slight difference in the set of monitors 
matched to the sample. The first stage estimates parallel the pattern observed in Figure 1 that air 
                                                          
20 The available years of AHS data only give census tract codes for 1980 and 1990, with 1990 codes only appearing 
for observations in 1997 and after. I obtained the historical tract boundaries from NHGIS (Minnesota Population 
Center 2004). Using GIS, I overlaid historical boundary files with the 2000 boundaries to determine weights such 
that the neighborhood variables from Geolytics could be reconstructed for 1980 or 1990 boundaries.  
21 For the sake of comparison, the Online Appendix additionally reports results from first differenced models 
(without instrumenting). The first difference results show smaller and statistically insignificant magnitudes of price 
response, reinforcing the importance of the IV strategy. 
22 The two-year interval coefficient on the instrument is similar in magnitude to other decadal studies: Chay and 
Greenstone (2005) estimate non-attainment status decreased PM10 5.2 µg/m3 (after translating TSP to PM10) and 
Grainger (2012) estimates non-attainment status decreased PM10 4.2 µg/m3. This suggests that households are able 
to discern and value changes of the magnitude 4-6 µg/m3 over a decade. The prior literature does not give any 
indication of whether that magnitude of change can be detected and valued in a 2-4 year time span, but my results 
suggest yes. The longer intervals have larger coefficients on the instrument than the other decadal studies due to the 
focus on individual monitors instead of county averages. 
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quality improved quickly after the onset of the 1990 CAAA and then stayed relatively constant 
across areas. The results also suggest that identification of the second stage parameters is not off 
of regression to the mean, as the impact of non-attainment grows with interval length.  
Turning to the second stage, Table 2 convincingly shows that declines in PM10 cause 
owner-occupied housing prices to appreciate. Coefficient estimates range from -0.0059 to 
-0.0139, with all estimates statistically significant at the 5% level or higher. Corresponding 
elasticities range from -0.23 to -0.63, with the six-year and ten-year interval being the minimum 
and maximum, respectively. The variance in estimates across intervals is likely due to the 
volatility of prices in the owner market, and the “true” marginal capitalization rate probably lies 
in the middle of the range. It is worthwhile to compare these estimates with others. The ten-year 
interval estimate of an elasticity of -0.63 is best to compare with estimates derived from 
Decennial Census data, which has been the most common source of data in the literature. Chay 
and Greenstone (2005) report elasticity of -0.28; for Bayer et al. (2009), the estimate is -0.63; 
Grainger (2012) finds -0.51; and Bento et al. (2014) report -0.60.23 My estimates are consistent 
with others, especially those using 1990-2000 data. 
 Switching to the second stage renter results, Table 3 demonstrates that, like owner-
occupied units, rental prices increase with increases in air quality. For intervals two and four, 
coefficient estimates are small (-0.0021 and -0.0025) and statistically insignificant, but then 
sharply jump to a statistically significant -0.0076 for the six-year interval and continue all the 
way to -0.0203 at a lag of ten years. At a lag of two years, the elasticity is -0.06. At a lag of ten 
years, the elasticity is over ten times larger at -0.87. The ten year interval estimates contrast with 
other estimates using Decennial Census data; both Grainger (2012) and Bento et al. (2014) find 
estimated renter elasticities to be about a third of what it is for owners. The discrepancy could be 
a function of their use of median values or aggregation bias. 
 Comparing the results for owners and renters, markedly different capitalization patterns 
emerge. For owners, there is no pattern of increasing or decreasing capitalization coefficients, 
though there is variance in the estimates across intervals. Thus, the results suggest that owner-
occupied units capitalize changes in air quality quickly. In contrast, coefficients for renters 
                                                          
23 The Chay and Greenstone estimates are for TSP and increased by a factor 1.82 to be comparable to PM10. The 
estimates drawn from Bayer et al. do not account for migration costs; elasticity increases when doing so. Kuminoff 
and Pope (2014) caution against interpreting capitalization as a measure of marginal willingness to pay, but as an 
additional comparison, my estimates yield MWTP in the range of $83 to $212, which is consistent with past 
research as well. 
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steadily grow in magnitude and significance as the length of the interval grows. The 10-year 
coefficient is statistically different than the two- and four-year estimates with p-values of 0.08 
and 0.075, respectively. For owners, the corresponding p-values are 0.33 and 0.62. Comparing 
coefficients between owners and renters, the four-year estimates are statistically different with a 
p-value of 0.04; the other intervals are not statistically different at conventional levels. Despite 
being initially low, elasticities for rental price responses reached parity with owners by the ten 
year interval. Given the sum of evidence, I conclude that rental prices are slower to respond to 
air quality changes than owner prices.24  
The comparison between owner and renter results leads to counterintuitive insights. First, 
conventional wisdom and some research (e.g., Banzhaf and Farooque 2013, Winters 2012) 
suggest that the renter market is better suited for valuation studies than the owner market because 
the high turnover rates and low financial costs of moving should allow prices to adjust quickly. 
However, the results here indicate that the fluidity of a market does not correspond to the speed 
of price response. It could be that households looking to own versus rent are more attentive to 
amenity levels.25 This is untestable in the current data, but recent rounds of the AHS contain 
questions on factors driving neighborhood choice. Of recent movers, the proportion of owners 
that chose their neighborhood based on looks or design was two-thirds larger than the same 
proportion for renters; in contrast, the proportion of renters that chose their neighborhood based 
on convenience to job or public transit was twice as large as the same proportion for owners (US 
Census Bureau 2013). 
Second, the results suggest that the rental market and owner market are not as closely 
linked as conventional wisdom holds. The valuation sharply and immediately diverges, but there 
is no evidence that this divergence is arbitraged either through financial instruments or people 
delaying home purchase to rent. However, the maximum disparity in annual costs resulting from 
air quality improvements, which is estimated to be at a lag of four years, is only $602, where the 
average increase in annual costs of living in a treated area are $652 for homeowners and $50 for 
                                                          
24 Due to the near exact relationship between air quality changes for renters and owners, the delay in price response 
for renters is not merely mechanically caused by attenuation bias in short intervals stemming from measurement 
error in air quality readings. 
25 An additional facet of the possibility of differing perceptions is that owner households may be more forward-
looking and more likely to form expectations about future air quality changes and be willing to pay based on those 
expectations. If this is the case, the short interval, owner valuation may reflect both concurrent changes in air 
quality and expected future changes, and this may explain some of the differing patterns of price response. Given 
the IV framework it is infeasible to test for expectations. 
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renters.26 While not insubstantial, this $602 difference is unlikely to be enough to induce 
arbitrage given the vast disparities among units and occupants between the two markets. 
 The suite of results for owners and renters is robust to using a two- or four-mile cutoff for 
monitor matches, controlling for sample selection by using only units that have at least 10 years 
of complete data, and controlling for pre-treatment price trends, as detailed in the Online 
Appendix. 
 
4.1 Dynamic Price Response Model 
As a robustness check, Table 4 presents results from a model that regresses change in 
housing prices on concurrent changes in PM10 and lagged changes in PM10. With this model, two 
first stage regressions are needed and the monitor non-attainment instrument for the current 
interval and lagged interval are both used as instruments. I estimate this model only for the two-
year interval data because the other models have weak identification for the current change in 
PM10 due to the vast majority of non-attainment designations occurring early in the decade.  
The results for owners, shown in the first column of Table 4, show that concurrent 
changes in PM10 are capitalized at a statistically significant rate of -0.0138, which is at the upper 
end of the estimates in Table 2. In contrast, lagged changes in PM10 have no capitalization effect 
on owner values. Turning to the renter results in the second column, the price response for 
concurrent changes in PM10 is statistically insignificant and even the perverse sign. However, the 
coefficient on lagged changes in PM10 is -0.0118, which is also on the larger side of estimates in 
Table 3, though also statistically insignificant. Further, the coefficients on concurrent changes for 
owners and renters are statistically significantly different with a p-value of 0.04. These results 
bolster those seen in Tables 2 and 3 that suggest that owner prices respond immediately to 
changes in amenities while renter prices lag behind amenity changes. 
 
4.2  Testing hypotheses for delayed rental price response 
 Table 5 offers a series of results from models that test three hypotheses for the cause of 
the delay in rental price response: 1) rental market rigidities, 2) disparities between rental and 
owner units in terms of geography and occupant and unit characteristics, and 3) using an 
                                                          
26 The annual costs due to PM10 improvements are calculated by multiplying price response coefficients by an 
annualized cost of housing and by the first stage coefficient and by the average instrument value for treated areas. 
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inappropriate price index. Sample sizes and first stage results are omitted due to disclosure 
restrictions.27 In each case the first stage is similar to that of Table 3. 
Panels A and B of Table 5 test whether price rigidities in the rental market could be 
causing the delay in price adjustment. The concern is that landlords tend to keep rental prices 
nominally unchanged from year to year when tenants renew a lease (Genesove 2003). Further, 
tenants in rent-controlled apartments tend to move less, and typically landlords can only 
modestly (if at all) adjust prices unless there is turnover.28 Thus, only when tenants leave do 
landlords raise rents to market levels that would reflect a change in amenities. To address this 
possibility, the Panel A specification excludes all units under rent control and Panel B includes 
only unit-intervals with turnover. In Panel A, the two- and four-year coefficients are double 
compared to those seen in Table 3, and the four-year coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
However, the ten-year estimate is five times larger than the two-year estimate and four-year price 
response estimate is still statistically different than the coefficient for owners (from Table 2). 
This suggests that rent control does impede some short term price response, but a lag in full price 
response still persists. The results of Panel B show a remarkably similar pattern of delayed price 
response to Table 3, suggesting that delayed price adjustment is common to all rental units, 
regardless of occupant tenure.  
 Panels C, D, and E of Table 5 test whether disparities between rental and owner units and 
occupants could be causing the delay in price response. Panel C ensures geographic overlap with 
owner units by limiting the sample to air quality monitors that match to both owner- and renter-
occupied units. If the spatial distribution is uneven and different areas experience different 
appreciation rates, then comparisons between owners and renters could be flawed. The results 
support the finding of delayed price response for renters. Panels D and E weight renter 
observations by the probability that they are owned. Table 1 demonstrated the significant 
differences between the characteristics of renter- and owner-occupied units and their occupants. 
If, for example, the types of units that wealthier people like to occupy appreciate faster than 
average, then this alone could explain the disparities in price response patterns. For both of these 
                                                          
27 As the sample changes with each cut of the data, the sample sizes and first stage results are withheld to minimize 
disclosure risk. This does not indicate small sample sizes; the Census Bureau requires both the desired cut and the 
omitted observations (or “shadow sample”) to pass disclosure tests. By not disclosing first stage results and sample 
sizes, I circumvent the disclosure test and can report results from more cuts of the data. 
28 This is especially important since rent control is practiced in Los Angeles (Los Angeles Housing Department 
2012), which comprises a disproportionate share of the treatment group. 
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models, a logit regression is estimated with the dependent variable equal to one if the unit is 
owner-occupied and zero if renter-occupied, then the estimated probabilities of a unit being 
owned are used to weight the renter observations. Panel D uses occupant characteristics (income, 
head is black or Hispanic, head is college graduate) to predict ownership, and Panel E uses both 
occupant and unit characteristics (number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, central AC). The 
results for Panel D closely match those of Table 3 in terms of magnitude and significance. Panel 
E shows the same pattern of delayed price response, but the standard errors have grown 
substantially.  
 Panel F of Table 5 tests whether using the CMHPI, a price index based on owner-
occupied sales, to de-trend rental rates could be causing the delay in price response. As an 
alternative, I create a similar index for each MSA using only AHS rental observations, but using 
the entire sample of the AHS, not just those that match to air quality monitors.29 There is a 
correlation of 0.86 between these two indices, and this is reflected in the results that are 
qualitatively identical to those in Table 3. 
 This section has examined three hypotheses regarding the delay in rental price response, 
but none have been able to explain the result. Given this, it seems likely that the disparities in 
price response patterns are attributable to differences in attentiveness about amenity levels. 
Because owners have a longer expected tenure and a greater financial stake in their location, they 
may be more likely to perceive changes in amenities, especially one like air quality that is 
imperfectly observed.  
 
5  SORTING RESULTS 
The delayed but sharply rising price response observed in the rental market offers an 
excellent opportunity to examine the relationship between valuation and preference-based 
sorting.30 The price response results suggest that something fundamentally changes going from 
the two- and four-year interval to the six-, eight-, and ten-year intervals. If there is a relationship 
between sorting and valuation, a similar shift in the turnover rate or demographics should occur 
at the six-year interval.  
                                                          
29 I also pursued using the REIS Inc. rent index, but it was prohibitively expensive for the timeline and geographic 
scope of my data. 
30 The corresponding owner-occupied sorting analysis is presented in the Online Appendix. Given the relative 
infrequency of moves among owner-occupiers, the data is inadequate to draw conclusions. 
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 Table 6 presents the results from estimates of Equation (3), giving the second stage 
coefficients on PM10, as well as the implied marginal effects. Again, sample sizes and first stage 
results are omitted due to disclosure restrictions. Panel A examines whether changes in PM10 
cause turnover to increase, and the model is estimated on the full sample appearing in Table 3. A 
negative coefficient implies that a reduction in PM10 increases the rate of turnover, which would 
be suggestive of preference-based sorting (with preferences potentially uncorrelated with 
observable characteristics). The estimated coefficients are positive and insignificant for intervals 
two and four. However, for intervals six and eight, the coefficient becomes negative and 
statistically significant. Further, the jump in the probability of turnover is economically 
significant; the total estimated increase in probability from four to six years given the total 
reductions in PM10 is 10.1%. For interval ten, the coefficient is positive and insignificant again. 
Panels B through F of Table 6 show the results of the sorting on observables analysis 
giving the estimates of the effects of PM10 on demographic changes. A negative coefficient 
implies that a reduction in PM10 increases the propensity of the given demographic group to 
move into rather than move out of that neighborhood. The results of Panel B suggest that 
improvements in PM10 consistently increase the likelihood of households with children under 18 
years of age of moving into an area. For intervals two and four the estimates are small and 
insignificant, but for intervals six, eight, and ten the estimates are larger and statistically 
significant. The six-year interval estimate implies a total increase in likelihood of 18.2%. Panel C 
suggests that older residents are more likely to be moving out of, rather than into, a 
neighborhood in response to a decline in PM10. While initially surprising given that the elderly 
are vulnerable to adverse health effects from poor air quality, this result is likely a product of 
small sample size – only 12% of the renter population is over 65 and they tend to be less mobile 
than others – leading to weak instruments and inflated second stage values, and thus little 
confidence is placed on these results. The ten year interval estimate is omitted because the first 
stage F-stat is less than 1.0. The results of Panel D and E suggest that the minority status and 
educational attainment, respectively, of a household are both unresponsive to changes in air 
quality, as coefficients flip signs multiple times and are mostly insignificant.31 Lastly, the 
household income results in Panel F suggest that the income level of new residents was lower 
than old residents for interval two, but flips signs and is insignificant for all other intervals.  
                                                          
31 Examining Black households and Hispanic household separately does not qualitatively affect the results. 
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The results of the sorting analysis suggest that changes in turnover frequency and the 
location preferences of households with children are responsive to changes in air quality and 
correspond to the rental price response patterns. Intuitively, households with children should 
value improvements in air quality more than households without children due to health concerns. 
However, we might also think that preferences may be correlated with income and education, but 
the results show no evidence of this.  
The sorting results introduce the possibility that some portion of the price increase is due 
to preferences for living near households with children or some unobservable trait common to 
the households that moved into cleaned up areas (the social multiplier logic of Bayer et al. 2007). 
While I cannot partition direct and indirect price effects, logically it seems likely that most is 
direct given that income, race and education levels (which are the key drivers in Bayer et al.) do 
not change on average between old and new occupants in cleaned up areas. 
 
6  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This paper uses rich housing market data and spatially disaggregated air quality data to 
examine changing housing prices and changing locational preferences in response to air quality 
changes brought on by differential regulatory pressure from the CAAA. This is the first paper to 
study the dynamic path of price adjustment in response to air quality changes and the first paper 
to examine the dynamics of price response to any changing amenity for owners and renters 
separately. The results suggest a disconnect between air quality price response patterns in the 
owner and renter markets. While owner-occupied houses capitalize changes immediately and the 
capitalization rate stays fairly constant over time, renter-occupied unit prices are slow to respond 
but then sharply increase up to the point that the elasticity estimates are on par for both groups. 
Tests of statistical differences support the ideas that rental price responses increase over time and 
that short-term price responses are different for owners and renters, though with the later point, 
the evidence is mixed. 
Conventional wisdom and stylized facts suggest several possibilities why the disparities 
in dynamic price response paths may exist. First, there are significant housing and occupant 
characteristic differences between owners and renters. If these differences are somehow 
correlated with perceptions of air quality changes then this could drive different dynamics. 
Second, the structure of the rental market may be such that it impedes rapid price changes, 
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through rent control or just infrequent price changes. Both of these ideas, however, fail to 
empirically explain the delay in rental price response. A final possibility, which is untestable in 
the current setting, is that owners may be more attentive of PM levels given their anticipated 
tenure and financial stake in the property. Supporting evidence of this, though indirect, comes 
from more recent AHS rounds that indicate owners are more likely to choose a house based on 
the looks of the neighborhood than renters, whereas renters are more likely to choose a house 
based on proximity to jobs and public transit (US Census Bureau 2013). The conventional 
wisdom that the renter market is better suited for valuation studies than the owner market given 
high turnover rates and low financial moving costs does not bear out in this dynamic setting.  
Regardless of why prices lag air quality changes in the rental market, it offers an 
opportunity to examine the relationship between price response and locational sorting. The 
results of the preference-based sorting analysis suggest that the turnover of rental units and the 
propensity for households with children to move into a unit both increase in recently cleaned up 
neighborhoods. This finding suggests heterogeneous preferences for air quality among renters, at 
least some of which is correlated with households with children. Importantly, the timing of the 
sorting coincides with price increases, both at a six year lag. Prior literature that has examined 
the links between price response and preference-based sorting has typically taken a cross 
sectional, equilibrium approach. This paper’s ability to observe the true dynamics offers 
additional and unique evidence bolstering the long-standing intuition of Tiebout’s “vote with 
your feet” ideas.  
 Given that we do see an increase in the turnover rate, there may be a concern that renters 
suffer a welfare loss when air quality improves (e.g., Starrett 1981, Sieg et al. 2004, Grainger 
2012). The fear is that when amenities improve, all of the new value goes to the non-resident 
owner, who can then charge higher rent leaving the tenants no better off – and potentially worse 
off if the renters cannot afford the new rent and must relocate into an area with worse air quality. 
While the sorting results in this paper suggest there is an increase in turnover, the results also 
show that the new occupants are no wealthier or better educated or whiter than the previous 
tenants. A related environmental justice concern is raised by Banzhaf and Walsh (2013), who 
argue that improvements in public goods will lead to increases in racial segregation. The results 
presented here fail to find support for that concern. A full welfare analysis is beyond the scope of 
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this paper, but at a minimum the results suggest that air quality improvements had an ambiguous 
welfare effect on renters.  
While the results as a whole inform policy by offering more evidence that households 
value clean air, more importantly the results inform methods of policy evaluation. Price changes 
in the housing market are frequently used to valuate preferences, measure benefits, and assess 
damages. The owner results, suggesting immediate and full capitalization of an imperfectly 
observed amenity, are a testament of the efficacy of the hedonic approach. However, the renter 
results suggest that if the timeframe of analysis is insufficient, then the estimated price response 
could be severely underestimated. Specifically, in the case of the valuation of the significant air 
quality improvements in the 1990s, if the time frame of study was too short, then the valuation 
estimates could be as little as one tenth of the true value. Future work should continue to explore 
disparate responses to amenity changes in the owner and rental market and seek to understand 
perceptions and belief formation among these two groups. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
 
List of variables used as covariates in regressions 
 
Unit Characteristics (from the American Housing Survey) 
New roof between beginning and end of interval (1=yes)* 
Kitchen remodeled between beginning and end of interval (1=yes) * 
New or remodeled bathroom between beginning and end of interval (1=yes) * 
Other addition between beginning and end of interval (1=yes) * 
Rent control at beginning of interval (1=yes)† 
Rent control at end of interval (1=yes)† 
 
Neighborhood Characteristics (from the Decennial Census) 
Population density 
Share Black± 
Share Hispanic± 
Share over 60± 
Share under 5± 
Share foreign born 
Share high school graduate± 
Share college graduate± 
Share unemployed 
Share below poverty line 
Share receiving welfare benefits 
Share living in the same residence for 5 years± 
ln(median family income)≠ 
Total housing units 
Share of units occupied 
Share of occupied units that are owner occupied 
 
County Economic Characteristics (from County Business Patterns and the Bureau of Economic Analysis)  
ln(number of jobs in construction +1) 
ln(number of jobs in manufacturing +1) 
ln(number of jobs in mining +1) 
ln(number of jobs in agriculture or forestry +1) 
ln(number of jobs in all other sectors +1) 
ln(average county income) 
 
                                                          
* Only available for owner-occupied units. 
† Only included for renter-occupied specifications. 
± These tract level variables were replaced with MSA averages for the sorting analyses. Additionally, the education 
variables were replaced with a single variable, average educational attainment, equal to the share of college 
graduates minus the share of high school dropouts. 
≠ Removed for sorting analysis since county average income is available at higher frequency from BEA. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
Figure 1: PM10 concentrations across time by attainment status 
 
Notes: Each air quality monitor in the sample is split into attainment categories by the following rule. If a monitor ever exceeds the NAAQS PM10 standards 
during 1989-2001, then that monitor is put in the ‘Monitor non-attainment’ group. If a monitor never exceeds the thresholds, but is located within a county 
designated non-attainment by the EPA at some point during 1989-2001, then that monitor is put in the ‘County non-attainment, Monitor in-attainment’ group. All 
other monitors are put in the ‘County in-attainment, Monitor in-attainment’ group. 
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Table 1: Housing and Occupant characteristics in 1989 
 
 Sample means  
Difference of 
owner and 
renter means 
 
Difference of           
non-attainment and     
in-attainment 
means 
Variable 
 
owners 
 
renters 
  
owners 
 
renters 
  
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
PM10 
 
35.3  35.9  -0.6  20.5*  17.8* 
Market value (2000$)  162,108           -11,835     
Annual rent (2000$) 
   
7,587      483 Household income (2000$)  41,179   23,429   17,750*   -395   6,584* 
Percent of households with children under 18 
 
32.7%  33.9%  -1.2  0.1  1 Percent of households with head over 65  31.1%   15.9%   15.2*   1   -4.3 
Percent of households with Black or Hispanic head 
 
16.6%  34.8%  -18.2*  1.9  -6.2 Percent of households with high school graduate as head  56.5%   51.6%   4.9*   -2.5   -7.4* 
Percent of households with college graduate as head 
 
27.7%  23.9%  3.8*  3.5  9.6* Number of bedrooms  2.9   1.7   1.2*   -0.1*   -0.1 
Number of bathrooms 
 
1.6  1.1  0.5*  0.1*  0 Square feet  2005   1037   967.8*   -409.6*   209.7 
Percent of units with a dishwasher 
 
51.2%  21.3%  29.9*  8.1*  3.7 Percent of units with central AC  37.7%   18.9%   18.8*   6.9*   3.6 
Percent of units under rent control 
   
8.5%      17.8* Change in log market value, 1987-1989  -0.024           -0.041     
Change in log annual rent, 1987-1989 
   
-0.026      -0.031 Change in household income, 1987-1989  2,667   2,446   221   2,446   2,197 
Percent of units with turnover, 1987-1989   7.4%   39.7%   -32.3*   2   -4 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) present means for units included in the main sample in year 1989. Column (3) differences Columns (1) and (2). Columns (4) and (5) 
difference units that are matched to a non-attainment monitor at somepoint during 1989-2001 to those units that are never matched to a non-attainment monitor. Sample 
sizes are as follows: 1712 for owners, 1381 for renters, 1471 for in-attainment owners, 241 for non-attainment owners, 1139 for in-attainment renters, and 242 for non-
attainment renters. * indicates a statistically significant difference of means at the 5% level. 
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Table 2: IV first difference results for owner occupied units 
  
Interval 
  
2 4 6 8 10 
First Stage 
     
 
Monitor non-attainment -5.75 -12.10 -19.21 -22.03 -16.22 
  
(0.83)*** (1.44)*** (2.23)*** (2.53)*** (3.51)*** 
 
F-stat 47.80 70.47 74.11 75.61 21.36 
       Second Stage 
     
 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -0.66 -1.01 -0.59 -0.83 -1.39 
  
(0.28)** (0.32)*** (0.3)** (0.39)** (0.7)** 
 
R-squared 0.001 0.007 0.010 0.070 0.099 
  Observations 17485 8961 5276 2972 1700 
Notes: The dependent variable in the first stage is the change in annual PM10 concentrations, and the dependent variable in 
the second stage is the change in the natural log of house value. Each regression uses the full set of controls listed in the Data 
Appendix. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the monitor level.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: IV first difference results for renter occupied units 
  
Interval 
  
2 4 6 8 10 
First Stage 
     
 
Monitor non-attainment -4.75 -12.34 -15.83 -17.53 -13.23 
  
(0.86)*** (1.12)*** (2.3)*** (2.61)*** (3.18)*** 
 
F-stat 30.44 122.36 47.46 45.23 17.34 
       Second Stage 
     
 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -0.21 -0.25 -0.76 -1.18 -2.03 
  
(0.35) (0.2) (0.32)** (0.58)** (0.98)** 
 
R-squared 0.032 0.088 0.147 0.110 0.041 
  Observations 15464 7394 4148 2166 1022 
Notes: The dependent variable in the first stage is the change in annual PM10 concentrations, and the dependent variable in 
the second stage is the change in the natural log of annual rent. Each regression uses the full set of controls listed in the Data 
Appendix. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the monitor level.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Results of IV lagged specification 
   
own 
 
rent 
First Stages 
    
 
F-stat predicting ΔPM10 (1/100) 
 
16.71 
 
13.55 
 
F-stat predicting lagged ΔPM10 (1/100) 
 
13.05 
 
8.90 
      Second Stage 
    
 
ΔPM10 (1/100) 
 
-1.38 
 
0.69 
   
(0.62)** 
 
(0.77) 
 
Lagged ΔPM10 (1/100) 
 
0.20 
 
-1.18 
      (0.75)   (0.92) 
Notes: The two-year interval data is used, and only unit-intervals with prior interval data are 
included. Each column reports results from three regressions: two first stage regressions, one 
predicting ΔPM10 and the other predicting lagged ΔPM10, and a single second stage regression. 
The instruments are monitor non-attainment status for the current interval and monitor non-
attainment status for the lagged interval. Each regression uses the full set of controls listed in the 
Data Appendix. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated using the Eicker-
White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the monitor level.  *, ** and 
*** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 5: Testing hypotheses for delayed rental capitalization 
 
Interval 
 
2 4 6 8 10 
Panel A: Exclude rent controlled units 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -0.40 -0.50 -0.80 -1.19 -1.99 
 
(0.38) (0.23)** (0.36)** (0.58)** (0.98)** 
      Panel B: Include only unit-interval observations with turnover 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -0.16 -0.08 -0.89 -1.19 -2.12 
 
(0.5) (0.36) (0.35)*** (0.57)** (1)** 
      Panel C: Geographic overlap for owner and renter units 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -0.18 -0.25 -0.76 -0.87 -1.71 
 
(0.36) (0.2) (0.33)** (0.58) (0.94)* 
      Panel D: Reweight by probability of owning based on occupant characteristics 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -0.24 -0.12 -0.58 -1.10 -1.82 
 
(0.37) (0.20) (0.31)* (0.50)** (0.85)** 
      Panel E: Reweight by probability of owning based on occupant and housing characteristics 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -0.22 -0.16 -0.24 -0.83 -1.19 
 
(0.33) (0.21) (0.47) (0.56) (1.02) 
      Panel F: De-trend using AHS-derived price index 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -0.17 -0.01 -0.59 -0.98 -2.22 
 
(0.32) (0.19) (0.28)** (0.51)* (0.99)** 
Notes: Each coefficient comes from a separate regression, identical to those in Table 3, except for the 
sample. Sample sizes are censored to reduce disclosure risk. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and 
are estimated using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the 
monitor level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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Table 6: IV first difference results for changes in turnover frequency and demographic 
characteristics of occupants for renter occupied units 
 
Interval 
 
2 4 6 8 10 
Panel A: Turnover 
ΔPM10 (1/100) 0.52 1.57 -3.33 -3.85 0.56 
 
(2.10) (0.91) (1.41)** (2.08)* (5.29) 
Marginal effect (%) 0.20 0.58 -1.11 -1.14 0.13 
      Panel B: Presence of children under 18 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -0.74 -2.03 -8.49 -7.51 -13.40 
 
(4.13) (3.32) (3.63)** (3.69)** (4.55)*** 
Marginal effect (%) -0.29 -0.78 -3.04 -2.65 -4.30 
      Panel C: Household head over the age of 65 
ΔPM10 (1/100) 3.65 10.62 8.33 14.07 N/A 
 
(8.73) (5.56)* (5.54) (5.08)*** 
 Marginal effect (%) 1.24 3.33 2.69 4.22 
       Panel D: Household head Black or Hispanic 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -3.90 -0.88 4.26 -8.81 0.81 
 
(3.04) (2.27) (3.73) (3.98)* (5.59) 
Marginal effect (%) -0.29 -0.78 -3.04 -2.65 -4.30 
      Panel E: Educational attainment 
ΔPM10 (1/100) -2.22 1.14 -4.67 0.88 -2.03 
 
(4.06) (1.81) (2.47)* (3.34) (6.27) 
Marginal effect (%) -0.87 0.44 -1.76 0.33 -0.75 
      Panel F: Natural log of household income 
ΔPM10 (1/100) 4.11 -0.85 -0.60 2.99 -0.90 
  (2.08)** (1.00) (1.52) (1.91) (3.29) 
Notes: Each coefficient represents a different regression. Each specification includes all covariates listed in the data 
appendix. For Panel A, the sample is the same as in Table 3, and the dependent variable is binary and equal to one if new 
occupants moved in to the unit at some point during the interval. For Panels B-F, samples include only unit-intervals that 
experienced turnover and where the demographic characteristic of choice changed. For Panels B-E, the dependent 
variable is binary and equals one if the unit gained in the given characteristic and equals zero if it lost. For example, if 
the out-moving occupant does not have children and the in-moving occupant does, then this would be coded as one. If 
both out- and in-moving occupants have children, then that unit-interval would be excluded from the sample. For Panel 
E, maximum educational attainment of all household heads is classified into high school dropout, high school graduate, 
and college graduate, and the dependent variable takes the value one if there is an increase in educational attainment 
along the lines of the three classifications (i.e., high school dropout moves out and high school grad moves in) and takes 
the value zero if educational attainment declines. The results shown in Panels A-E are estimated using an IV probit 
specification. Panel F is estimated using least squares, still in the IV first difference framework, as the dependent variable 
is continuous. “N/A” indicates that either the model did not converge or the first stage instrument had a F-stat less than 
1.0. Sample sizes are censored to reduce disclosure risk. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are estimated 
using the Eicker-White formula to correct for heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the monitor level.  *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
